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Expectations have been shown to be 
powerful modulators of pain [1] and 
emotion [2] in placebo studies. In 
such experiments, expectations are 
induced by instructions combined with 
manipulation of the sensory experience
that is unknown to the subjects. After 
an expectation learning phase where 
a painful stimulation is surreptitiously 
lowered following placebo application, 
the placebo effectively reduces 
subjective pain intensity in a 
subsequent test phase [3]. The strength
of this placebo effect is closely related 
to the induced expectation [4]. Here, we
asked whether this powerful cognitive 
bias reflects a general property of 
sensory information processing and 
tested whether the contents of visual 
awareness could be altered by a 
placebo-like expectation manipulation. 
We found a dramatic effect of 
experimentally induced expectations 
on the perception of an ambiguous 
visual motion stimulus. This shows 
that expectations have a strong and 
general influence on our experience of 
the sensory input independently of its 
specific type and content.
Ten healthy human observers 
participated in a behavioral experiment 
where they viewed a random-dot 
kinematogram (RDK) that is perceived 
as a cylinder rotating in depth despite 
the absence of depth cues (Figure 1) 
[5]. The rotation direction is ambiguous,
resulting in bistable perception with 
spontaneous direction reversals every 
few seconds. Participants had to report
perceptual reversals, and to indicate 
the level of perceptual confidence 
(high-confidence, low- confidence 
or uncertain) by pressing different 
keys. During an ambiguous baseline 
run, average durations of perceived 
right- and leftward rotation did not 
differ (Figure 1A; t(9) = 0.79, p = 0.45, 
paired two-tailed t-test). In the 
subsequent expectation learning 
phase, participants viewed a different 
version of the RDK in which ambiguity 
was minimized through the provision 
of red-green three-dimensional depth 
cues [5]. The participants now wore red- green 
glasses, however, making them 
unaware of the difference from the 
previous ambiguous stimulus. They 
were told they would be presented with 
the same ambiguous RDK as in the first 
run, and that just the use of red-green 
glasses would strongly bias rotation 
perception towards one direction. 
The depth cues were consistent 
with this dominant direction in 80% 
of total viewing time and reversed 
unpredictably and unbeknownst to the 
observers with a frequency based on 
the reversal rate during the ambiguous 
baseline run. In a second learning run, 
the red-green glasses were switched, 
which reversed the perceptual bias. 
As expected, perception was strongly 
biased by the depth cues, resulting 
in significantly longer average phase 
durations of rotation in the dominant 
direction (Figure 1 B,C; t(9) = 9.9, p < 
0.0005). While the participants believed 
that this was just an effect of the 
red- green glasses, it was actually due 
to the stimulus manipulation.
During the subsequent test phase, 
participants again wore the red-green 
glasses and were told that the two 
following runs were identical to the 
 
 
 
 
 
preceding runs. While therefore again 
expecting a strong bias towards one 
rotation direction, they were now 
unknowingly presented with completely 
ambiguous stimuli lacking any depth 
cues, as in the baseline run. Strikingly, 
perception was still strongly biased 
towards the expected direction (Figure 
1D,E; t(9) = 3.4, p < 0.008) which, in 
the absence of depth cues, was purely 
due to the expectation induced by 
the learning phase. This expectation-
induced perceptual bias was stable 
across the entire test phase (see Figure 
S1 in the Supplemental data available 
on-line with this issue). In a final 
ambiguous baseline without red-green 
glasses, no difference was observed 
between durations of right- and leftward 
rotation (Figure 1F; t(9) = 0.13, p = 0.90). 
Did participants truly perceive what 
they reported during the test phase 
or were they just reporting what they 
expected? Such a response bias 
should have led to an increase in 
expected percepts at the expense of 
low-confidence or uncertain percepts. 
However, the proportions of low 
confidence and uncertain percepts 
did not differ from the baseline runs 
(t(9) = –0.5, p = 0.66 and t(9) = –0.9, 
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Figure 1. Schematic illustration of the experimental paradigm and results. 
Bar plots show average percept durations normalized to each participant’s mean percept 
duration in ambiguous conditions (A,D,E,F). Error bars denote standard error of the mean. 
*p < 0.05 and **p < 0.001, paired two-tailed t-tests.
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−L+M (cyan), S −(L+M) (lavender), 
and −S+(L+M) (lime) [15,16,18]. As in 
the LGN, the overwhelming majority 
of color-opponent neurons in V1 are 
tuned along the red-cyan axis [15,16].
Color-tuned neurons have 
recently been found in posterior 
inferior temporal cortex of the 
macaque monkey, clustered within 
millimeter- sized modules dubbed 
globs, downstream from V1 and V2 
[19,20]. We determined the color 
tuning of the population of glob cells 
described in that study (Figure 1). 
Although neurons tuned to all 
directions in color space were found 
[20], the population distribution 
was not uniform, and is markedly 
different from that obtained in LGN 
or V1. The population distribution 
contains three prominent peaks. 
The largest peak aligns with red; 
the second largest, with green; and 
the third, with blue. The distribution 
also includes a bulge that peaks 
in the yellow. These peaks are 
roughly consistent with unique 
colors identified by human subjects 
(symbols, Figure 1). The three 
prominent peaks also correspond 
to the three most saturated colors 
in the stimulus set (see Figure S1 
in the Supplemental data available 
on-line with this issue); and the size 
of each of the peaks corresponds 
to the relative saturations of the 
hues, suggesting that both hue 
and saturation are represented by 
relative number of glob cells. The 
relative size of each of the peaks 
also corresponds to the frequency 
with which these color terms is 
adopted by language: red is adopted 
first, then yellow or green, followed 
by blue [4]. These results extend 
those of Zeki [21] and Komatsu et al. 
[22] and are, to our knowledge, the 
closest explicit neural representation 
of unique colors in the primate brain. 
The stimuli consisted of flashed 
(200 ms ON/200 ms OFF) optimally 
shaped bars surrounded by a 
neutral-adapting gray field. Color 
tuning was assessed by varying 
the color of the bar. Three sets of 
equiluminant colors were used: 
one set was equiluminant with 
the adapting-gray field; one set 
was higher luminance than the 
adapting field; and one set was 
lower luminance than it. The 
population tuning was consistent 
across stimulus sets, except for a 
subtle shift in the location of the 
Neural basis for 
unique hues
Cleo M. Stoughton  
and Bevil R. Conway
All colors can be described in terms 
of four non-reducible ‘unique’ hues: 
red, green, yellow, and blue [1]. These 
four hues are also the most common 
‘focal’ colors — the best examples 
of color terms in language [2]. The 
significance of the unique hues has 
been recognized since at least the 
14th century [3] and is universal [4,5], 
although there is some individual 
variation [6,7]. Psychophysical linking 
hypotheses predict an explicit neural 
representation of unique hues at 
some stage of the visual system, but 
no such representation has been 
described [8]. The special status of 
the unique hues “remains one of the 
central mysteries of color science” 
[9]. Here we report that a population 
of recently identified cells in posterior 
inferior temporal cortex of macaque 
monkey contains an explicit 
representation of unique hues.
Color in humans and macaque 
monkeys depends on the differential 
responses of the three cone 
types — L, M and S — an operation 
typified by parvocellular neurons 
of the lateral geniculate nucleus 
of the thalamus (LGN). LGN cells 
can be categorized according 
to color preference, but these 
categories do not correspond to 
unique hues [6,10,11]. Instead, 
multi-stage models have been 
developed, locating the essential 
color calculation to brain regions 
subsequent to the LGN in the visual 
processing hierarchy [12,13]. Such 
models describe a recombination 
of the cone signals to produce 
color tuning that corresponds to 
perception, but it is also plausible 
that the LGN output is simply filtered 
so that only that minority of LGN 
cells with appropriate color tuning is 
routed to color-processing regions 
of cortex. In either case, neurons 
downstream of the LGN at the first 
cortical stages of vision (V1 and V2), 
are, however, unlikely to encode 
unique colors [14–17]: like neurons 
in the LGN, color-opponent neurons 
in V1 are tuned to colors lying close 
to the cardinal color axes defined by 
cone opponency: L −M (bluish-red),; p = 0.38, respectively). Moreover, 
analyses of only high confidence 
states yielded similar results as when 
high- and low- confidence states were 
pooled (see Supplemental Data). 
Together with the numerically large and 
robust difference between expected 
and unexpected percepts in the test 
phase, these observations speak to a 
true perceptual bias rather than a mere 
response bias.
Our work shows that experimentally 
manipulated expectations not only 
affect the perception of pain [1,6] or 
emotion, but can have a more general 
influence on how we experience the 
world, as evidenced by a striking effect 
of expectations on the contents of 
visual awareness. This opens the door 
for studies of how perception and belief 
systems are biased by expectation in 
general and in pathological states such 
as delusions.
Supplemental data
Supplemental data are available at http://
www.current-biology.com/cgi/content/
full/18/16/R697/DC1
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